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Abstract
Logical analysis, according to Bertrand Russell, leads to and ends
with logical atomism, an ontology of atomic facts that is epistemologi-
cally founded on sense-data, which Russell claimed are mind-independent
physical objects. We rst explain how Russells 19141918 epistemolog-
ical version of logical atomism is to be understood, and then, because
constructing logical forms is a fundamental part of the process of logical
analysis, we briey look at what has happened to Russells type theory
in this ontology. We then turn to the problem of explaining whether or
not the logical forms of Russells new logic can explain both the forms
of atomic facts and yet also the sentences of natural language, especially
those about beliefs. The main problem is to explain the logical forms for
belief and desire sentences and how those forms do not correspond to the
logical forms of the facts of logical atomism.
According to Bertrand Russell all philosophy is logic,by which he meant
that every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis
and purication, is found either to be not really philosophical, or else to be, in
the sense in which we are using the word, logical(OKEW, 42). By necessary
analysis Russell meant logical analysis, i.e., formally breaking up a complex
whole into its separate parts or constituents, and then explaining the way the
parts are held together in terms of a logical form (OKEW, 52). Logical forms
are themselves determined by a background logic, which is a formal system the
grammar of which determines the logical forms of the system and the principles
of which, usually consisting of axioms and inference rules, determine what is
valid or provable in the system. In such a background logic, logical forms will
have truth conditions and deductive consequences that are more perspicuous
than they are in ordinary language. Russells implicit background logic was his
ramied theory of types.
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1 On Logical Forms and Facts
A standard view of the complexes to which logical analyses are to be applied are
the declarative sentences of ordinary discourse. That is certainly what Russell
assumed when he said that some kind of knowledge of logical forms, though
with most people it is not explicit, is involved in all understanding of discourse
(OKEW, 53). This is because in order to understand a sentence it is necessary
to have knowledge of both the constituents and of the particular instance of the
form(ibid.). Thus, by logical analysis on this view one claries or explicates
the logical forms people implicitly understand in their use of language, thereby
also clarifying the truth conditions as well as the logical implications of what
they say or understand others to say to them.
But Russell also claimed that facts, or at least the atomic facts of logical
atomism, have logical forms as well, and facts are part of the world, not of
language (PLA, 183). Indeed, true atomic sentences, or what Russell called ele-
mentary propositions, are true because there are atomic facts in the world that
they mirror in a one-to-one correspondence, and which therefore have the same
logical form (PLA, 199). Such atomic facts provide the truth conditions for el-
ementary propositions. But the atomic facts and elementary propositions that
correspond to them in Russells logical atomism are not the facts and propo-
sitions we talk about and use in our analyses of ordinary discourse. Russells
atomic facts and elementary propositions are the result of a di¤erent kind of
analysis, and in particular one based on the immediate objects of experience.
In logic, or so Russell claimed, we are concerned with the form of facts,
the di¤erent logical sorts of facts there are in the world(PLA, 216f). Indeed,
according to Russell, one might describe philosophical logic... as an inventory,
a zoo containing all the di¤erent forms that facts might have (PLA, 216).
One kind of fact in particular that Russell was concerned about are general
facts. He argued, for example, that if you try to verify a universal sentence All
A are Bby verifying the set of atomic propositions of the form x is an A and
x is a B, you will have assumed that you have a complete list of the relevant
atomic facts, and that that is but another universal sentence, and moreover one
which you cannot verify in the same way (PLA, 236). That is true, but that is
an epistemological argument regarding how we can verify a general statement,
and, as such, it is independent of the ontological claim that there are general
facts.
We should be clear here that knowing the atomic facts that correspond to ele-
mentary sentences su¢ ces (in, e.g., model theory or Carnaps state descriptions)
to explain the truth conditions of complex sentences of a formal language, in-
cluding those containing quantier phrases or at least that is so for extensional
formal languages. That means that the truth conditions of general statements
are also determined by the atomic facts, and therefore Russells suggestion that
we might need general facts can be put aside and not taken seriously insofar
as the truth conditions of general statements are in question. For more on this
issue of facts in the world, see section 6 below.
Russell apparently thought that there are di¤erent kinds of facts in his on-
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tological zoo. In particular, he assumed that there are facts corresponding to
belief statements, which of course are the kind of assertions we express in ordi-
nary discourse. But there is a problem of explaining the structure of such facts,
and problems also of whether or not their truth conditions can be accounted for
in Russells logical atomism. We discuss this problem in section 5 below.
The correspondence between the logical forms of Russells logic and the
logical forms of facts brings in more than a theory of the logic of ordinary
language, and in fact it brings in the ontology of logical atomism, and, as we
will see in section 2, it is a fact ontology that is essentially based on a certain
epistemological view of the foundations of knowledge. In section 3 we discuss
how Russell tried to connect the facts of logical atomism with the facts of the
physical world as ordinarily understood. In section 4 we explain how Russells
implicit background logic is not quite what he thought it was.
2 The Ontology of Logical Atomism
Russell called his framework logical atomism because it consisted of many
separate things(PLA, 178), but there really is much more to Russells logical
atomism than that. Certainly, one could have an ontology other than Russells
logical atomism that consists of many separate things. Classical Greek atomism,
for example, consisted of many separate things. But, in fact, Russells atomism
is not at all the same as Greek atomism. This will become clear as we explain the
version of atomism that Russell had in mind in the years 19141918, which began
with Russells 1914 article The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics (SDP),
chapters 24 of his 1914 book, Our Knowledge of the External World (OKEW),
The Ultimate Constituents of Matter (1915), and then was developed more
in his 1918 lectures, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism(PLA). Russell also
described a modied version in his 1924 paper, Logical Atomism(LA), but we
are mainly concerned here with the 191418 version of Russells logical atomism.
The many separate things of Russells logical atomism as an ontology are
referred to by Russell as simples and complexes. The complexes are called
atomic facts (and possibly some general facts and belief facts), and the simples
are called particulars, qualities and relations. Atomic facts are composed of
particulars having qualities or standing as the terms of a relation. All of the
remaining things in the world are represented in terms of these simples through
a process of logical analysis and construction, the result of which all other
things, including the objects of mathematics, are or can be considered as logical
ctions.These logical ctions embrace practically all of the familiar objects of
daily life: tables, chairs, Piccadilly, Socrates, and so on(PLA, 253). Just this
sort of ontological project explains why Russell claimed that the business of
philosophy is essentially that of logical analysis, followed by logical synthesis
(LA, 341).
Particulars, according to Russell, are the terms of relations in atomic facts.1
1PLA, pg., 199. Apparently, qualities in atomic facts with a single term are also called
relations by Russell.
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But these particulars are not, as we have said, the atomsof classical Greek
atomism, i.e., the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus. Atoms in classical Greek
atomism are the smallest bits of matter that in a completely random way clump
together in a void to make arbitrary larger clumps of matter, some of which in
time ultimately make up suns, planets, people, and all of the familiar objects of
daily life. Russells particulars, on the other hand, were the objects of sense,
e.g., patches of color, sounds, and smells. He called these objects sense-data
and sometimes sensibilia. In general, sensibilia are those objects which have
the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data, without necessarily
being data to any mind(SDP, 148). Sense data are not mental,but in fact
are part of the actual subject-matter of physics(DSP, 149). Russells atoms,
in other words, are the atoms of a kind of phenomenalism, except that they are
also said to be physical, and Russells phenomenalism neither assumes nor
denies the existence of other physical objects.2 Sense-data are the particulars
that have qualities and stand in the various relations of the atomic facts that
make up Russells ontology. But even more radical, at least in his 1914 work,
Russell allowed for the possibility of unsensed sensibilia. Unsensed sense data,
just as sensed sense data, were said to be physical,not mind-dependent, enti-
ties, which is why they can exist even if unsensed (SDP, 151f). Each particular
sense datum, according to Russell, has its being independently of any other
and does not depend on anything else for the logical possibility of its existence
(PLA, 203), including minds. An epistemology based on sense data might per-
haps be a reasonable starting point for knowledge about the world, at least
for some philosophers, but an ontology based entirely on sense data is another
matter altogether unless of course one is a subjective idealist or a solipsist.
But Russell was quite explicit that his version of phenomenalism was denitely
not subjective idealism, and the independence of sense data as physical objects
precludes solipsism as well.
As physical objects, unsensed sense-data are actual physical objects and not
merely possible physical objects. Unsensed sense-data and possible sense-data
that are not actual sense data are di¤erent ontological kinds of sensibilia. A
merely possible sense-datum is a possible physical object that would exist, i.e.,
be an actual physical sense-datum, if a mind were to be at a certain perspective
where that mind could be acquainted with that sense-datum. Such a possibility
presupposes the reality of physical space and, apparently, the reality of a mind
that could be acquainted with sense-data, and also a modality that would be
the basis of subjunctive conditionals regarding being acquainted with merely
possible sense-data. But, for reasons connected with Occams razor, Russell
claimed that he could construct a counterpart, i.e., a logical ction, of real
physical space and similarly a logical ction counterpart to a mind. Perhaps that
is why Russell assumed that unsensed sense-data were actual physical objects
and not merely possible objects. An analogy here is with Bishop Berkeleys
famous problem of whether or not a falling tree makes a sound in a forest when
2A discussion of sense data as physical objects can be found in Russells 1915 paper The
Ultimate Constiuents of Matter, reprinted in Mysticism and Logic.
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no one is around. For Berkeley the answer is yes because God is always around
to hear the sound of the falling tree. For Russell, on the other hand, there is
no god, but the sound impression still exists as an unsensed sense datum, a
physical object that exists independently of actually being sensed.
On the other hand, it is not clear what it means for sense-data to be physical
objects in logical atomism, given that physical objects are logical ctionsto
begin with (because the notion of a physical object is a notion constructed
in logic3), suggesting that sense-data must then be logical ctions as well. It
is dubious, however, or at least not clear that Russell ever had any of these
considerations or problems in mind in his account of unsensed sense-data, and
it is an ontological category that he simply doesnt mention again after 191415.
In any case, sense-data are all that we directly and primitively know of the
external world(SDP, 148), according to Russell. They are for that reason the
foundation of all knowledge. This is an epistemological doctrine, and as such it
is the basis of the phenomenalistic ontology of Russells logical atomism. In this
phenomenalism, Russell does not deny the existence of the familiar objects of
daily life.Rather, he says that we need not assume their existence if we can
logically construct their counterparts as logical ctions.
Sense-data are what names in the logical sensedenote, where names in the
logical sense are names like thisor that(OKEW, 83). According to Russell,
it is only when you use this quite strictly to stand for an actual object of
sense that it is really a proper name(PLA, 201). It is because particulars are
objects of sense that Russell speaks of the qualitiesof particulars and not of
their properties. Knowing a particular merely means acquaintance with that
particularand its qualia (204); and, moreover, we can be acquainted only with
objects of sense.
In his 191013 framework (of PM and PoP), Russell did say that we can
be acquainted with facts as well as particulars, facts such as my-seeing-the-
sun, or an-object-a-having-the-quality-q, and a-in-the-relation-R-to-b. At that
time, Russell used perfect nominalizations of sentences to denote such facts,
which then became terms that could be arguments of predicates. In PM,
for example, Russell said that among the particulars with which we can be
acquainted there are also complexes such as this-above-that, the-yellowness-of-
this, etc.
But in 1914 and thereafter, Russell no longer allowed nominalized sentences
to occur as terms of relations. Thus, according to this later Russell, you
can never put the sort of thing that makes a proposition to be true or false
in the position of a logical subject  (PLA, 188). In other words, in Russells
logical atomism we can be acquainted only with particulars, namely, sense-data.
Moreover, if the existence of the atoms of modern physics are to be veried,
according to Russell, it must be solely through their relation to sense-data
(RSDP, 145.) This issue about nominalized propositional forms is really about
logical form, a topic we take up in section 5 of this essay.
It is noteworthy that Russell also called particulars events, and in 1912 he
3See, e.g., UCM page 128.
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called events facts (PoP, 49). But in 1914 and thereafter, events are not facts
but sense-data. This is because, according to Russell, sense-data are the objects
of sensations, and sensations are mental events. But in 1914 and for some time
thereafter Russell assumed that a sense-datum is identical with a sensation
(OKEW, 83).4 From that assumption it follows that a sense-datum is an event.
This claim, incidentally, is contrary to what Russell wrote in 1912 (PoP, 12).
Anyway, given that sense-data are events, we can see why Russell would later
write that each of the simple entities of the world may be called an event
(LA, 341). In other words in Russells atomism bits of matter are not among
the bricks out of which the world is built. The bricks are events... (LA, 329).
3 The Bridge Between the World of Sense and
the Physical World
The bridge between the physical world and the world of sense is to be built,
according to Russell, by means of a logical construction within the logic of
logical atomism. The task requires a very great amount of logical technique
and is a very di¢ cult one to carry out. The idea is that for each kind of thing in
the physical world we are to construct a logical ction having the same formal
properties, or rather having formally analogous formal properties to those of
the supposed metaphysical entity (PLA, 272). The construction can then be
substituted for the supposed metaphysical entity and full all the scientic
purposes that anybody can desire (ibid.). In speaking of a certain desk, for
example, as being the same through a period of time, all we can know is that
there are a certain series of appearances linked together, and the series of those
appearancesis essentially what Russell denes as the desk (PLA, 273). In that
way,according to Russell, all the ordinary objects of daily life are extruded
from the world of what there is, and in their place as what there is you nd
a number of passing particulars that one is immediately conscious of in sense
(ibid.).
The construction is only briey sketched by Russell, and he emphasizes that
he is only constructing a possible theory(OKEW, 95). The idea is that from
moment to moment each mind looks out upon the world ... from a point of
view peculiar to itself(ibid., 94). The system consisting of all points of view
of the universe, perceived and unperceived,is called the system of perspectives
(OKEW, 95). The unperceivedperspectives involve unsensed sense-data. A
momentary common-sense thingappears from an uncountable number of per-
spectives, not all of them actually sensed. Some of the perspectives, e.g., of a
penny, are in conict with other perspectives; e.g., some being round, some
elliptical, some are at, etc., all from di¤erent positions. The momentary con-
structed thing is then identied by Russell with a class of perspectives that
are somehow selected at that moment from the totality of perspectives by means
4Ultimately, Russell gave up the idea that sensations are mental (as opposed to neurolog-
ical) events. See MPD, 136.
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of the multiplicative axiom (which in type theory is equivalent to the axiom of
choice). Here, incidentally, we note that the multiplicative axiom is needed only
because unsensed sense data at the innitely many di¤erent perspectives are
actual physical objects, and, supposedly, an innite subclass of perspectives is
to be selected. But still, Russell does not say who, or what, applies the multi-
plicative axiom. It cannot be the mind of a person whose perspectives are at
stake, because there is not always a person at those perspectives. And it can-
not be some metaphysical aspect of the universe or of Russells ontology, or at
least not without some further explanation. None of this is explained. Nor does
Russell explain much of his construction at all, and in fact the whole process of
construction in this way seems quite dubious.
A more plausible logical construction has been given to some extent by
Rudolf Carnap in his 1928 Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (The Logical Con-
struction of the World). One important di¤erence is that for Carnap there are
no unsensed sense-data, and the atomsof his construction are elementary ex-
periences (Erlebnisse) and not logically independent sense data, which indicates
that Carnaps version of phenomenalism is di¤erent from Russells.5 In particu-
lar, Carnap does not assume that elementary experiences are mind-independent
physical objects, and it is important to note that he does not use the axiom of
choice at all. He also calls his framework methodological solipsism. In a way,
Carnaps solipsism is like Wittgensteins in the Tractatus, according to whom
solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure
realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension and there re-
mains the reality coordinated with it(Tract. 5.64). Finally, another di¤erence
is that Carnaps logic is his version of simple type theory where, unlike Russells
implicit logic in this period, predicate expressions can be terms or arguments of
higher-order predicates. This di¤erence is explained more in section 4 below.
All of the concepts of science, according to Carnap, can be analyzed and
reduced to certain basic concepts that apply to the content of what is given in
experience. One of the important patterns for such an analysis is known today
as denition by abstraction, whereby, relative to a given equivalence relation
(i.e. a relation that is reexive, symmetric and transitive), certain concepts are
identied with (or represented by) the equivalence classes that are generated
by that equivalence relation. This pattern was used by Frege and Russell in
the analysis of the natural numbers (as based on the equivalence relation of
equinumerosity, or one-one correspondence), and was then used again by Russell
and Frege in the analysis of the negative and positive integers, the rational
numbers, and even the real numbers. In addition, Carnap, who took denition
by abstraction as indicative of the proper analysisof a concept, generalized the
pattern into a form that he called quasi analysis(but which really amounted
to a form of synthesis), that could be based on relations of partial similarity
instead of full similarity, i.e., on relations that amount to something less than
5 In the 1961 preface to the English translation of his Aufbau Carnap does say that he
would prefer using Ernst Machs terminology concrete sense data instead of elementary
experiences for the basic elements of the system. But there are no unsensed sense data or
unexperienced elementary experiences in Carnaps framework.
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an equivalence relation. An example of a partial similarity is that between the
c-e-g musical chord and other chords containing c but not either e or g, or e
but not either a or g, etc.
The concepts denable in terms of a quasi-analysis specify in what respect
things (especially items of experience) that stand to one another in a relation of
partial similarity agree, i.e., the respect in which they are in part, but not fully,
similar (see Carnap 1928, sections 71-74). In this way Carnap was able to dene
the various sense modalities (as classes of qualities that intuitively belong to the
same sense modality, where concepts for sense qualities are denable in terms
of a partial similarity between elementary experiences), including in particular
the visual sense and color concepts (as determined by the three-dimensional
ordering relation of the color solid).
Using the various sense modalities, Carnap went on to construct the four-
dimensional space-time world of perceptual objects, which, with all its vari-
ous sense qualities, has only provisional validity, and which, for that reason,
must give way to the strictly unambiguous but completely quality-free world of
physics(Carnap 1928, 207). We cannot go into the details of Carnaps con-
structional denitions here, but we might note that all that Carnap meant
by a logical analysis by means of such denitions was translatability into his
constructional language i.e., into an applied form of the simple theory of log-
ical types as based on a primitive descriptive constant for a certain relation of
partial similarity between elementary experiences. Such a translation need not,
and in general did not, preserve synonymy, nor did it in any sense amount to an
ontological reduction of ordinary physical objects to the sensory objects of expe-
rience. What it did preserve, according to Carnap, was a material equivalence
(i.e. an equivalence of truth-value) between the sentences of ordinary language,
or of a scientic theory, and the sentences of the constructional language.
Carnap was quite clear, incidentally, that his work was inspired by Russells
description of his view of a logical construction of the world in terms of a foun-
dation built up in terms of experience. The question as to what extent Russell
could accept Carnaps construction is problematic, as we will see, because for
reasons having to do with the issue of logical form, Russell in this period could
not allow the higher stages of Carnaps construction that go beyond second-
order logic.
4 Logic and Logical Form in Russells Logical
Atomism
We should not think that the logical framework Russell assumed in his logical
atomism is the ramied theory of types that he, along with Alfred North White-
head, developed in their Principia Mathematica. As I have explained in some
detail in a previous paper (the details of which we will not go into here), the
logistic system Russell is committed to in his logical atomism is a fragment of
second-order predicate logic, where the (rst-order) predicate constants stand
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for the simple qualities and relations of di¤erent degrees.6 It is important to
note here that the di¤erent degrees means only the di¤erent number of terms
that rst-order predicates may take as arguments (PLA, p.206f).7 Third- and
higher-order type theory is excluded in Russells logical atomism because that
would require that predicates (and relations), or (capped) propositional func-
tions, can be terms or arguments of higher-order predicates, and that possibility
is excluded by Russells atomist ontology.8
Thus, according to Russell, a predicate can never occur except as a pred-
icate (PLA, p.205). Similarly a relation [qua expression] can never occur
except as a relation, never as a subject(PLA, P. 206). Russels explanation is
that the di¤erent sorts of words, in fact, have di¤erent sorts of uses and must be
kept always to the right use and not to the wrong use, and it is fallacies arising
from putting symbols to wrong uses that lead to the contradictions concerned
with types(PLA, 206).
Russell is correct that the functional role and use of a predicate or relation
(qua expression) grammatically cannot occur as a subject of a predicate or term
of a relation. Nevertheless, both predicates and relations (qua expressions) can
be and are transformed in natural language by a process called nominalization,
and they then can occur as terms or arguments of predicates and relations. Thus
the predicate wiseas in Socrates is wisecan be nominalized into wisdom,
and then occur as a subject, as in Socrates exemplies wisdom, where exem-
pliesis a two-place predicate with Socratesand wisdomas (subject) terms.
Similarly triangularand rectangularcan be transformed into triangularity
and rectangularity, and verbs such as loves and runs can be nominalized
as verbal nouns such as lovingand running, or as innitive phrases as in to
loveand to run. The relation of identity as in is identical withcan be simi-
larly nominalized as identity, and used as a term as in identity is a two-term
relation. For complex predicate expressions, which Russell called propositional
functions (qua expressions), we would need a variable-binding operator such
as Russells cap notation, as in '(x^), or Churchs -operator before we could
properly nominalize such a predicate expression, and adding such is not at all
problematic. Accordingly, once we realize that nominalization is a standard
procedure of natural language and one that Russell himself engaged in prior
to his adoption of logical atomism then the issue of grammatical correctness is
not itself a reason to exclude this nominalized treatment of predicates as Russell
claims.
But there are at least two important issues that must be dealt with before we
can allow adding nominalized predicates and relations to our logic. The rst has
to with whether or not the use of nominalized predicates would lead to a contra-
6See Cocchiarella 1987, chapter 5, or Savage 1989, 4162. We note that Russell seemed
unaware that he could no longer use his original type theory for his atomist logic.
7Russells use of the word order here means adicity, as an nth order predicate is really
an n-adic predicate. Normally, by higher-orderpredicate logic we mean a higher type level.
The two notions of order should not be confused with one another.
8Russells fragment of second-order predicate logic could be extended to ramied second-
order predicate logic so long as predicate quantiers for the extended logic are given a substi-
tutional interpretation. See Cocchiarella 1980.
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diction, as Russell claimed. One immediate response is Russells own earlier logic
of ramied types, which included the use of nominalized predicates or proposi-
tional functions as arguments or terms of third- and higher-order logic. Russell
seemed to be simply ignoring or overlooking this use of nominalized predicates
or propositional functions in his own type theory.9 The important restriction of
type theory (simple or ramied) is that predicates are distinguished according
to type so that nominalized predicates or propositional functions of one type
can occur as arguments or terms only of predicates or propositional functions
of a higher type. Such a restriction succeeds in avoiding the paradoxes Russell
had in mind in this context.10 In addition, as I have shown elsewhere, one need
not turn to third- and higher-order logic but can instead remain in second-order
logic with nominalized predicates allowed so long as either certain metalinguistic
restrictions are imposed on complex predicates (as -abstracts) as in my logic of
HST, or otherwise we modify our rst-order logic to a logic free of existential
presuppositions regarding singular terms (-abstracts, in particular, occurring
as terms), as in my logic HST.
11 Both of these logics are equivalent to the
simple theory of types, which is known to be consistent. Russell doesnt dis-
cuss the matter at all but simply assumes in PLA that nominalized predicates
or (capped) propositional functions cannot be subjects of other predicates or
propositional functions, higher-order or otherwise.
The second important issue about such a transformation is just what does a
nominalized predicate denote as a singular term. In his earlier work, especially
his Principles of Mathematics (PoM), Russell took the occurrence of nominal-
ized predicates or relations as terms to denote the same properties and relations
that they stood for in their functional roles as predicates and relations. Thus, for
example, Russell assumed that Socrates is wiseand Socrates has wisdomare
formally equivalent, because the predicate wisestands for the same property
as the abstract singular term wisdom. But, without appropriate restrictions,
the result of allowing nominalized predicates led to a contradiction, specically
to what is now known as Russells paradox (of predication). This interpretation
can also be given for the rst of the second-order logics mentioned above that
I have developed, namely the logic HST , which provides an appropriate re-
striction, and which then results in a consistent reconstruction of Russells views
in PoM, including his controversial treatment of plurals in terms of classes as
many.12
Frege, as I have explained elsewhere, recognized the transformation of pred-
icates and relations into nominalized forms in his second-order logic, and he
9Perhaps it was because he was never explicit about the transformation of the predicative
role of predicates and propositional functions into terms or arguments of higher-order predi-
cates and propositional functions. Or perhaps, as we note below, it was because in PoM and
then in PM he took a nominalized predicate to denote the same universal that the predicate
in its predicative role stood for.
10Russells ramication of type theory was designed for certain semantic paradoxes as well,
which do not concern us here.
11See Cocchiarella 1985, 1986 chapter 4, or 1987, chapter 4.
12See Cocchiarella 2002 for a consistent formulation and development of the logic of classes
as many, which I have also used in my treatment of the logic of mass nouns.
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took their denotata to be their extensions (Wertverläufe).13 A denition of
membership in a class could then be dened in terms of predication, and the
result was that Freges logic contained a logic of classes (in the logical sense) as
part of his predicate logic.14 The result, without appropriate restrictions, was of
course that Russells paradox could then be derived, which meant that Freges
logic was inconsistent. But the second alternative of second-order logic with
nominalized predicates that I developed and mentioned above, namely, HST  ,
provides a consistent reconstruction of Freges logic (but now based on a free
rst-order logic).15
But the properties and (intensional) relations of Russells 1903 Principles
cannot be accommodated in Russells logical atomism nor can the extensions
(Wertverläufe) of Freges logic, or the sets of set theory. Nevertheless, we main-
tain that there cannot really be a logically perfect languagefor logical atomism
given Russell refusal to allow for nominalization and all its uses in that language.
This is because Russells phenomenalism, as based on a physicalist interpreta-
tion of sense-data, is not a suitable framework for abstract entities of any sort.
In other words, neither classes nor properties and relations can be allowed in
Russells ontology of logical atomism. Russell did not seem to be aware of how
his atomist ontology truncated his logic. In particular, Russell can no longer
construct the logical ctions of mathematics in his truncated logic. Nor can he
construct the bridge between his ontology and the physical world.
5 Logical Form and Intensionality
Regarding the nature of belief, Russell asked: What is the form of the fact
which occurs when a person has a belief(PLA, 217). Here we might note we
are back to the issue of the logical analysis of ordinary discourse rather than
the logical construction of the world in terms of logical atomism. We are also
back to the issue of complex facts, including facts that occur when people
have beliefs.
In turning rst to the facts of belief we should rst recognize the distinction
between dispositional belief and occurrent belief. There is no single fact or
event that is associated with dispositional belief; rather, there are a number
of events indicative of what a person believes, including that persons verbal
statements about his/her belief. This behaviorist notion of belief was familiar
to Russell, and in fact he later came to adopt a modied (or supplemented)
13See Cocchiarella 1985 and 1987, chapter 4.
14By classes in the logical sense, I mean a theory of classes that have their being in the
concepts whose extensions they are. The sets of ZF set theory have their being in their
members, not in concepts. Indeed, there may very well be many more sets than there are
concepts. Set theory is a bottom-up theory, whereas a logic of classes as the extensions of
concepts is a top-down theory.
15 I have adopted and developed a di¤erent interpretation of this logic based on a concep-
tualist theory of predication. Nominalized predicates denote the intensional content of the
concepts (qua cognitive capacities) whose content they are. As based on the institutionaliza-
tion of nominalization in the evolution of language, this is a mitigated version of intensional
realism. See, e.g., Cocchiarella 2007.
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form of behaviorism as his own view. But in PLA, Russell rejected behaviorism
and insisted that one must be dealing here with a new form of fact as a new
kind of logical form.
Occurrent belief, on the other hand, is more a matter of either asserting
verbally or thinking internally. In either case, it is a persons mental act, which
might or might not be expressed verbally. Consider Russells example of some-
one asserting I believe that Socrates is mortal. How does this di¤er from when
that person is simply asserting Socrates is mortal? The latter is a statement
about Socrates and the fact in question is that Socrates is mortal. Asserting the
sentence I believe that Socrates is mortalseems to be about the person and
his or her beliefs, but, normally, people dont speak about their beliefs in this
way. Rather we say things like I believe in democracyor I believe in justice for
the innocently accused, etc. Belief as normally expressed in this way does not
involve two verbs, namely believeand the verb of some proposition expressing
our belief. Something like this was Russells later view in LA where he said of
propositional attitudes like rst-person belief that these attitudes do not form
part of the proposition, i.e., of the content of what is believed when we believe,
or desired when we desire(LA, 309).
Of course, the problem is that we do assert third-person sentences such as
Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio, to use Russells example, but
which for convenience we will abbreviate as A believes that B loves C. In this
case we do have two verbs, namely believesand loves. Russell claimed that
it is not only the proposition that has two verbs, but also the fact, which is
expressed by the proposition, has two constituents corresponding to two verbs
(PLA, p.217). The problem is how is such a fact is to be represented in terms
of the logical forms of Russells logical atomism.
One rather standard analysis of this sentence is to represent belief as a
relation between A and the proposition that B loves C :
Believes(A; that-P );
where that-P is the sentence B loves C nominalized (so that it can occur
as a term of the relation). But in Russells logical atomism, along with all
other abstract entities, propositions are nothing(PLA, p.223), and therefore
nominalized sentences are nothing as well so they cannot be allowed, and hence
this analysis cannot be given in Russells framework. Similarly, Russells analysis
in terms of his earlier multiple relations theory of belief is excluded as well,
because it involves nominalizing the predicate loves as a term of belief in a
four-term relation:
Believes(A;B;Loves(x^; y^); C);
where, using Russells cap-notation, Loves(x^; y^), read as to loveor loving, is a
nominalized form of the verb loves. As already noted, (nominalized) predicates
are not to occur as terms in the formal language of Russells logical atomism.
So this analysis is also excluded.
Another alternative is analyzing belief as an intensional operator that is
indexed by the term A, which we will formally represent by Believes-thatA,
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and which is read as A Believes-that.16 Note that on this analysis the relative
pronoun that occurs as part of the operator and not as part a nominalized
sentence. The result of applying this operator to a propositional form results
in another propositional form (the way that the modal operator  for necessity
functions):
Believes-thatA(B loves C):
Here the propositional form B loves C is not nominalized (thereby indicating
that the verb loves occurs as a verb). Of course, adding such an operator means
modifying Russells logic and formal language for his version of logical atomism
from an extensional logic to an intensional logic (or even a hyperintensional
logic). Such an extension would allow for logical forms of sentences containing
other intensional verbs such as desire. That would answer Russells query
about how a logical analysis of such sentences could possibly be given.
The problem with this and other similar proposals is the question about
what sort of new fact corresponds to the logical form that results from such
a logical analysis. Russells query in particular is: What is the form of the
fact which occurs when a person has a belief(PLA, 217), and similarly when
a person desires that something be the case. It does not seem to be like an
atomic fact that might correspond to an elementary sentence. Yet, we want to
suggest that it just might be what corresponds to a subject-predicate sentence
nevertheless, but not one with a simple subject or a simple predicate, and not
one that represents an atomic fact of Russells logical atomism.
The point is that a modal or intensional operator that applies to a propo-
sitional form and results in another propositional form when applied in a par-
ticular case is equivalent to applying (predicating) an intensional (higher-order)
property to a proposition, and hence in a sense it is analogous to asserting a
subject-predicate sentence. What it then represents is not an atomic fact, of
course, but if, as Russell insists, it represents a fact at all, as his query sug-
gests, then what it represents is an abstract fact, which is not really part of the
ontology of logical atomism. In other words, for A to assert that B loves C,
is equivalent to A asserting that the proposition that B loves C has a certain
intensional (higher-order) property represented by the operator Believe-thatA,
and therefore the fact, if any, that corresponds to such an assertion (as its truth
condition) is an abstract fact. Such a result would suggest that we cannot escape
having propositions and maybe even abstract facts as part of Russells ontology
of logical atomism if we are to make sense in that ontology of intensional verbs.
6 Some Assumptions and Consequences of Rus-
sells Ontology of Facts
We initially started this essay by noting that according to Russell some kind
of knowledge of logical forms ... is involved in all understanding of discourse
(OKEW, 53). We take this to mean that logical forms underlie our thoughts,
16This approach was rst given by Jaako Hintikka 1962.
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i.e., our judgments, as well as the sentences we use or statements we make
in expressing those thoughts. This, as we noted, is the standard view of the
application of logical analysis. It is a view that goes back to the medieval
terminist philosophers, and probably to Aristotle and Aquinas as well. In other
words, for philosophers, and perhaps some linguists as well, the study and use of
logical analysis and logical form is the fundamental and perhaps most important
part of the study of language and thought. We take this to be a fundamental
assumption of Russells logical atomism.
For Russell, however, logical analysis and logical forms apply not only to
the study of language and thought, but to the facts that make up the world,
and therefore for all the other things that are based on those facts. In other
words, according to Russell, philosophical logic is concerned not just with the
logic of language and thought, but also with describing the world in terms of
an inventory or zoo containing all the di¤erent forms that facts might have"
(PLA, 216).
A second basic assumption of Russells logical atomism, accordingly, is that
each fact in the world has a logical form. The logical forms of atomic facts,
in particular, consist either of an object and a quality or of n-many objects
and an n-place relation, for each natural number n. In Wittgensteins version
of logical atomism the world consists only of atomic facts, which, as already
noted, su¢ ces to account for the truth conditions of all of the sentences of an
extensional formal language. But in Russells version there are other kinds of
facts as well, with other kinds of logical forms.
Now turning rst to atomic facts, the main question is what accounts for
their unity, i.e., what unies the constituents or components of an atomic fact?
The answer for Russell cannot be the so-called tieor relation of exemplication
that many philosophers claim as the basis of predication, because that would
require qualities and relations to be objects on a par with the objects that have
those qualities or stand in those relations, as in the expression x exemplies y,
or x1; :::; xn exemplifyn y(where exemplifynis the the n-place tiethat is the
counterpart of the two-place tieexemplify). Wittgensteins alternative was
a quasi-physical counterpart to Freges notion of unsaturatedness (Ungesätigeit)
and that is an essential aspect of every relation that is the nexus of an atomic
fact.17 In both cases, however, what is defended is a metaphysical notion that
must be taken as primitive and left unexplained, except perhaps by hints (as in
Freges case) or in terms of a so-called language known as Jumblese.18 Russell
himself, at least in the 191418 period never says how the unity of an atomic fact
is to be explained. He simply ignores the issue, except to say that relations are
what hold a relational fact together, but he does not explain how relations do
this, nor what holds a monadic fact together where there is no relation involved
(and calling qualities relations will not do).
A third basic assumption of logical atomism is that facts in general are
truth-makers; in other words, facts are the ontological ground of the truth-
17What is unsaturated nexus of atomic monadic facts was an issue in much of the later
literature on Wittgensteins logical atomism.
18See Sellars [1962] for a description of Jumblese.
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conditions of our judgments and statements about the world. This was clear in
our observation that true atomic sentences are true in logical atomism because
they mirror atomic facts, and therefore they have the same logical form as
the facts they mirror. This feature of atomic facts is related to the fourth basic
assumption of logical atomism, namely, that the logical form of a fact, complex
or atomic, corresponds to the logical form of the sentence that it makes true,
or false as the case might be. If this were not so, then one fact would no more
correspond to a true sentence than another fact. In other words, if a fact did
not have a logical form that corresponds to a sentence that has that form, then
there could be no correspondence between it and any sentence that it makes
true. It is because facts have logical forms that they can be the truth makers
of the sentences to which they correspond.
What this means is that logical forms are a fundamental feature of the world,
even though they are not discoveredthrough empirical investigations of nat-
ural science but rather only through logical analysis of language and thought.
Moreover, because logical structures relate logical forms with each other in re-
lations of logical consequence, then the structure of logic itself must be part
of the structure of the world. This means that the question of which logic is
the correctlogic, i.e., the logic that correctly describes the logical forms that
facts have in the world would seem to be a matter of which logic best accom-
modates the analysis of language and thought. There is no other way to form
an inventoryof the facts that make up the world.
One signicant consequence of this result is that Russell is now committed
to either adopt a formal logic more in line with language and thought, which
would include a sublogic of nominalized predicates, a tense, modal and deontic
logic, a logic of plurals and mass nouns, and perhaps other features such as
a logic of questions, commands, performative verbs, etc. of natural language
that either have already been, or might yet be, developed. If Russell could not
give up his more restrictive extensional logic, then he must give up the idea of
there being complex facts and allow only for atomic facts as the truth-makers
of atomic sentences, with the truth values of all other formulas of his formal
logic then being thereby determined (as described in model theory or Carnaps
state descriptions). In particular, he must then give up the idea that there is a
complex fact corresponding to a judgment of the form A believes that B loves
C.
7 Concluding Remarks
What did Russell do? Russell did not give up his extensional logic, but he did
give up assuming that there is some one fact corresponding to a judgment of
the form A believes that B loves C. In 1919, only one year after he gave his
denitive account of logical atomism, Russell modied his view both of propo-
sitions and of behaviorism. In particular, he adopted a version of behaviorism
that he supplemented with an imagist theory of meaning in which propositions
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are complex images.19 Image propositions are in no sense abstract entities, but
there is more to expressing a proposition than having a complex image. Other
animals can have complex images, but in general they (and we) are not express-
ing propositions whenever such images occur. And even granting the notion
of an image proposition, Russells does not explain whether or not an image
proposition can function as a term, and hence solve the problem of representing
the logical form of judgments of what others believe. They are also problematic
because images are subjective, not objective, entities, and as such they cannot
really su¢ ce for interpersonal meaning and communication. In particular, one
person cannot compare his/her image proposition with another persons image
proposition so that we could know that they are expressing the samepropo-
sition (when they occur in di¤erent people and therefore are really di¤erent
images). Also, it is dubious that we can form images of things in the micro-
physical world smaller than the wavelength of light things that we understand
almost solely by mathematical formalism. It is also dubious that we can form
and communicate images that denote or stand for abstract entities, regardless
whether or not there are such entities. Imagist theories of meaning were popular
in medieval philosophy, but they have long since been rejected by both linguists
and philosophers.
Russell does not say how introducing image propositions answers the ques-
tion of what logical form a judgment of the form A believes that B loves Chas,
unless, of course, he assumes that an image proposition of the sentence B loves
Ccan be a term in a relation of belief. But in fact he must reject this answer
because image propositions are themselves facts, and facts cannot be terms of
relations in Russells logic. So we still do not know what Russell takes to be
the logical form of this judgement. We know only that his modied account of
behaviorism is supposed to provide the truth conditions for the judgment.
Another important change occurred in the ontology of Russells 1924 version
of logical atomism. In the 1924 version logical constructions are no longer based
on sense-data as the ultimate simples. The bricks out of which the world is
built are still events, but they are not sense-data events. In Russells 1924
outline of a possible structure of the world, the world consists primarily of
events, and all other objects, including minds, are to be constructed in terms of
sets of so-called compresentevents.
Russell moved from his 1914 view of the ultimate simples of the world as
physical sensibilia, which included unsensed as well as sensed sense-data, to his
1918 view of mentioning only sensed sense-data, and then nally in 1924 not
mentioning sense-data at all. Instead, simples are nally objects not experienced
as simples but known only inferentially as the limit of analysis(LA, 337). In
addition, according to Russell, science has a much greater likelihood of being
true in the main than any philosophy hitherto advanced(LA, 339).
19See Russell 1919.
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